Scientific Evidence has an enormous impact on Jurors. When government witnesses assume the role of experts the jury assumes their neutrality and scientific objectivity. Trial lawyers battle to uncover the prosecutorial bias of police officers masquerading as experts based on their experience. In State v. Fitchitt the Second Division of the Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction based on an officer qualifying as an expert defining what a 60 supply of marijuana in a unlawful manufacture of marijuana case because of the harmless error standard. But, the appellate court found that the officer should not have qualified as an expert. Here’s the Court of Appeals:
Here, Detective Alloway offered no explanation for his claim that nine plants in each of the three stages of marijuana growth constituted a 60-day supply, and he proffered no training or experience to support his claim. Detective Alloway did not testify that he had any training in the potency of marijuana, the metabolic rate at which a person processes marijuana, dosage requirements for various qualifying conditions, or how much marijuana is necessary for Fitchitt’s own 60-day supply. Although Detective Alloway has considerable training in how to cultivate and harvest marijuana, he offered no knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in how much medical marijuana a patient, and specifically Fitchitt, needs for a 60-day period. Without a foundation in the record establishing Detective Alloway as an expert in determining the necessary 60-day supply of medical marijuana, the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Fitchitt’s objection and permitting Detective Alloway to testify in this regard.
Rule of Fitchitt – Generally qualifying as an expert is not enough. A witness must specifically qualify to all parts of the foundation that make up their opinion. Break down all the individual parts of experts offered testimony and match that testimony up with foundation.
State v. Rick B. Fitchitt, Court of Appeals, Division II, UNPUBLISHED OPINION, No. 38466-3-II. August 5, 2011