On Tuesday, the department’s Office of Professional Accountability announced that it would open an investigation into the conduct of Sanford, and Seattle’s Ethics and Elections Commission indicated that it may conduct its own probe as well. However, King County prosecutors said that Sanford would not be charged with any criminal wrongdoing.

Among the allegations against Sanford are:

arriving on the scene of a minor traffic accident involving his daughter last year, and helping to convince (and maybe intimidate) the other driver not to file an accident report with the police
collecting donations for the Special Olympics and jokingly saying that he would not sign overtime pay slips for sergeants who did not contribute
pressuring a civilian employee to include a potentially security-compromising computer testing procedure as well as another testing preparation book in the materials for sergeants’ examinations.

Sanford insists that he was just acting as a father at the accident scene, and that his interactions with the civilian worker were nothing more than “robust debate.”

To complicate matters further, Sanford is the person in charge of implementing the recommendations outlined in a U.S. Justice Department investigation into excessive force by SPD. Some believe that people within the department who are against the changes being executed are targeting Sanford as the scapegoat.

The 51-year old Sanford is a 28-year veteran of the Seattle Police Department, oversees five different precincts, and heads the Patrol Operations Bureau.

Yesterday, three people were arraigned on felony charges in a King County courtroom for crimes which were allegedly perpetrated during the protest. Authorities are going over video footage from the protest in an attempt to identify others who engaged in criminal activity.

On the surface, it may appear that because the three suspects are facing felony charges, they must have committed a fairly serious crime – like burning a building, looting merchandise, or beating up a bystander. But in reality, that’s not really the case.

A 23-year old art student was ordered held in jail on a $10,000 bond after having a five-foot long pole confiscated by police during the march (these weapons were often used to smash windows or assault people). But the man wasn’t arrested for that; after starting to walk away from the officers, he turned around and spit on one of them. He faces a charge of third-degree felony assault.

A 28-year old barista was part of a group of people who refused to step back after being ordered to do so by officers who were making another arrest. But again, the man was placed under arrest for additional behavior: grabbing a police officer’s arm hard enough to cause “physical pain.” An attorney for the barista, who also faces felony assault charges, claims that her client was taking pictures and did not touch the officer.

Finally, a 30-year old hospital emergency room technician also defied orders to step from police officers who were forming a “mobile fence line.” You guessed it: the woman was not placed under arrest until she allegedly punched an officer in the chest. She faces trial on felony assault charges as well.

It remains to be seen whether the trio is convicted of the charges facing them. But here’s the moral of the story: if you’re protesting, the quickest way to get arrested is to directly confront an individual police officer.

That’s exactly what happened in the case of a case of a man who was convicted of growing marijuana on his Yakima property. Police were reportedly informed that Patrick Lyons was growing pot and attempted to get a search warrant. Yakima Police Officer Gary Garza issued an affidavit to a judge saying that a confidential informant had told him “within the last 48 hours” that he/she observed marijuana being grown at Lyons’ address. The warrant was issued, and police found 200 marijuana plants in a pole barn on Lyons’ property.

The suspect was charged with possession and manufacture of marijuana with intent to sell. But Lyons challenged the warrant, saying that the affidavit submitted by Garza “failed to state timely probable cause.” Lyons argued that the affidavit stated that the informant had reported to Garza “within the last 48 hours,” but there was no mention of when the informant had actually observed the marijuana. The judge in the case granted Lyons’ motion to quash the evidence.

Interestingly enough, a state appeals court overruled the trial judge, saying that the phrase “within the last 48 hours” could be construed to mean the timeframe when the informant saw the marijuana in Lyons’ barn. But the Washington Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with the appellate court in State v. Lyons and ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to obtain the warrant because the 48-hour period described when Garza received the tip, and not when the pot was actually seen. As a result, the warrant was deemed defective and the subsequent search was ruled illegal.

This is an important distinction because without a timeframe being established, the informant could conceivably have been talking about an instance 20 years ago, which would have been outside the statute of limitations. And since every citizen is innocent until proven guilty, this lack of timely probable cause was enough to keep Lyons out of prison.

That’s what happened to a Lewis County man before the Washington Supreme Court freed him earlier this month. Three years ago, Michael Caton was ordered to register as a sex offender with the sheriff’s office. When he did so on May 19, 2009, he was told that he had to report to the sheriff every 90 days as part of his arrangement. The first date on which he was ordered to report was June 16.

On June 9, Caton was arrested on a traffic violation, and upon his release from jail the next day he appeared at the sheriff’s office (which he understood was his responsibility to do after being released from confinement). He then reported to the sheriff again on June 17. But because he was one day late, he was arrested and charged with failure to report as a sex offender. He was subsequently convicted at a bench trial and sentenced to 50 months in prison.

But in State v. Caton, the state Supreme Court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to imprison Caton. The court decided that the statute did not specifically require Caton to report on the exact date on which he was ordered to appear. Since Caton did report within the 90-day period (twice, in fact), he satisfied the letter of the law and did not violate his duty to report as a sex offender. The ruling reversed Caton’s conviction and set him free from prison.

It’s quite possible that the Lewis County sheriff’s office simply misinterpreted the law. But one wonders whether the zealous prosecutory tendencies toward sex offenders which pervade law enforcement agencies played a role in Caton’s arrest.

Which is why a case in Sycamore, Illinois is so unusual. A 72-year old Seattle man is on trial for a rape that he is accused of committing 50 years ago.

Jack McCullough has been charged with raping a then-14 year old girl in 1962. The victim claims that McCullough picked her up in a convertible and drove her to a home, where he and two other men raped her. In Illinois, the statute of limitations for the crime of rape is 10 years, but the state’s attorney’s office claims that the “clock stopped” in this case when McCullough left the state.

It’s unclear whether that reasoning will stand up to legal scrutiny, but McCullough may very well be acquitted of the charges anyway. There is no physical evidence in the case, and McCullough elected to have a “bench trial,” which means that a judge will decide guilt or innocence instead of a jury. The alleged victim testified on Tuesday, but it’s not clear whether McCullough will take the stand in his defense (which is not required to do).

Regardless of how this trial turns out, McCullough will face unrelated charges of murdering a 7-year old girl in Sycamore back in 1957. That trial is scheduled to begin this summer.

Most often, the confrontation clause is discussed when a victim of a violent or horrible crime must testify while his or her alleged attacker is in the courtroom. But this clause applies to other cases as well, including one which resulted in a man’s conviction being overturned recently.

On March 15 of this year, the Washington Supreme Court dismissed the charges against Douglas Jasper, who was charged with felony driving with a suspended license back in February of 2008. During the original trial, prosecutors introduced an “affidavit from a legal custodian of driving records” which stated that Jasper’s license had been suspended. The defense objected to the evidence, but Jasper later admitted under cross-examination that he knew his driver’s license was suspended. Jasper was convicted, but appealed the verdict on the basis that he was not allowed to confront the person who introduced evidence against him – namely, the custodian who was named in the affidavit.

Even though the defendant admitted that he was aware of the status of his license, the state Supreme Court vacated the verdict and remanded the case back to a lower trial. Under the constitutional protections of our court system no matter where evidence comes from or how it is introduced into a case, an accused must be given an opportunity to question his or her accusers.  The Supremes of Washington have chosen to follow the U.S. Supreme’s, who recently have also pronounced that cross examination is one of the pillars of our justice system that ventures to guide us closer to the truth.

But until that time, the King County Council was tasked with figuring out who would serve in her stead. As expected, the council awarded the job to Steve Strachan, Rahr’s chief deputy sheriff. The 25-year law enforcement veteran served as the police chief of the Seattle suburb of Kent for five years before joining the King County Sheriff’s Department in 2011. Prior to that, Strachan was a police chief, city councilman, and state legislator in the state of Minnesota.

In March, Strachan was appointed interim sheriff; and he will now occupy that position until a special election is held in November. But whoever wins that election will only earn the right to fill Rahr’s term until it expires in 2013 – when the regularly-scheduled sheriff’s election will be held in King County.

Strachan is expected to run in this fall’s election to remain sheriff on a permanent basis. There was some talk among the county council that a “caretaker” sheriff – someone who did not plan on running for the post and therefore did not have an incumbent advantage in November’s election – should be appointed to the interim post. However, Rahr herself was appointed interim sheriff when Dave Reichert departed for Congress. Rahr then won the election in 2005 and ran unopposed four years later.

Once Haynes called in police reinforcements, the trio was handcuffed and detained. While Jake Baijot-Clary was lying face down on the ground in cuffs, Haynes stepped on his head and gave him a concussion. The entire incident was captured by a police car’s dashcam video.

This week, a jury found Haynes not guilty of misdemeanor assault.

During the trial, Haynes testified that he didn’t remember stepping on Baijot-Clary’s head, meaning that it couldn’t have been intentional (although the defense did not introduce any medical records to support its claim). Haynes also claimed that one of the three men who were detained tried to reach for his gun during the brawl – but then admitted under cross-examination that he did not disclose that detail to the Seattle PD officer who wrote up a report on the incident.

A closer look at the dashcam video appears to show Haynes reaching out with his foot to kick a prone Baijot-Clary, then quickly walking away from him. The jurors saw this video, but acquitted Haynes anyway after just 90 minutes of deliberations.

After the verdict was read, Haynes said, “I feel like justice was served here today.”

There appear to be two distinct versions of what happened being offered by the prosecution and the defense. Prosecutors claim that Haynes was arguing with a woman and then grabbed her, telling bystanders to call 911. When Haynes started to drag the woman away, Baijot-Clary followed and a fight subsequently broke out. Officers arrived and handcuffed Baijot-Clary and his friends but left Haynes free. It was then that Haynes stomped on the head of Baijot-Clary.

But the defense tells a different story. Haynes’ attorney claims that the officer was trying to retrieve the coat from the woman and did not drag her. He claims that the men were intoxicated and surrounded his client, attacked him from behind, and went for his gun. The defense attorney also says that there was no criminal intent when Haynes stepped on the head of Baijot-Clary.

This trial will almost certainly have racial undertones. Haynes is black, while the victim and his two friends are white.

So you may be surprised to learn that the Washington Supreme Court denied the will of the voters – and it wasn’t because the issue in question was unconstitutional.

This week, the high court ruled that voters are not allowed to ban red-light cameras in their cities. The case centered around a 2010 ballot initiative in the city of Mukilteo which voters passed overwhelmingly. In a split 5-4 decision, the state Supreme Court declared that because the state legislature had given Mukilteo permission to install the cameras, the action was not subject to repeal via the ballot box because the “legislature’s grant of authority does not extend to the electorate.”

In a somewhat unusual move, all four justices who disagreed with the decision signed a dissenting opinion written by Justice James M. Johnson. The dissent notes that because the Mukilteo City Council chose to remove the red-light cameras after the vote, the issue is moot and should not have been ruled upon by the high court. As it stands, the Supreme Court decision has invalidated similar efforts to prohibit red-light cameras in Bellingham, Longview, Redmond, Monroe, and Wenatchee.

The ruling also sets an unsettling precedent. How many future laws will be immune from citizen efforts to change or repeal them? And what does this mean for the democratic process in Washington in the future?